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of populism in Europe
MAX SCHAUB 1 & DAVIDE MORISI 2
1Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), Germany; 2Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, Italy
Abstract. Can the diffusion of broadband internet help explain the recent success of populist parties in
Europe? Populists cultivate an anti-elitist communication style, which, they claim, directly connects them
with ordinary people. The internet therefore appears to be the perfect tool for populist leaders. This study
shows that this notion holds up to rigorous empirical testing. Drawing on survey data from Italy and
Germany, a positive correlation is found between use of the internet as a source of political information
and voting for populist parties. By instrumenting internet use with broadband coverage at the municipality
level, the study then demonstrates that this relationship is causal. The findings suggest that part of the rise
of populism can be attributed to the effect of online tools and communication strategies made possible by
the proliferation of broadband access.
Keywords: populism; broadband internet; voting behaviour; Italy; Germany
Introduction
Recent years have been marked by the stunning success of populist parties, politicians and
ideas. Populist parties, most of them leaning distinctly to the political right, have been a
phenomenon in many Western European countries for several decades. Yet their electoral
impact has never been as powerful as in the relatively recent round of national elections
across Europe, which also coincided with the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald
Trump as United States president. In an attempt to explain this increasing success, scholars
have pointed to factors such as economic insecurity and crisis, anti-immigration sentiments,
a general cultural backlash and the decline in traditional parties’ representative function
(for overviews, see Inglehart & Norris 2017; Ivarsflaten 2008; Kriesi 2014;Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser 2018).Without challenging these explanations,we turn our attention to another,
less explored factor (but see Moffitt 2016): the impact of online communication tools made
possible by the proliferation of broadband internet. We explore the idea that the rise of
populism can be explained by the diffusion of the online platforms and communication
strategies that fast internet has made available. In a nutshell, we argue that one of the
reasons why populist politicians and parties are increasingly successful is that broadband
internet has provided them with new tools that perfectly suit their communication
needs.
Populism can be understood as a communication style that is distinctly anti-elitist and
claims to promote the will of the ‘ordinary’ people (Canovan 1981; Jagers &Walgrave 2007).
The anti-establishment rhetoric of populists finds a perfect ally in broadband internet as a
medium that connects political leaders directly to their supporters. What is more, populists
often struggle to get their messages across in the mainstream media – especially when these
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messages rely on unverified content and are socially provocative. Online communication
solves this problem, giving populists unfiltered access to their audience (Kriesi 2014;Moffitt
2016).This advantage is somewhat unique to populists, as mainstream parties and politicians
face fewer restrictions in the first place. For established political players, broadband internet
provides just another communication platform. For populists it has been a game changer,
providing them with a communication channel that allows them to maintain ideological
consistency and circumvent gatekeepers.
We draw on a body of literature that describes how the internet and social media have
contributed to political extremism and the polarisation of attitudes. This work has shown
that broadband internet can increase partisan hostility (Lelkes et al. 2017), influence turnout
(Campante et al. 2018; Falck et al. 2014; Larcinese & Miner 2017) and increase electoral
uncertainty (Sudulich et al. 2015), while social media have been shown to spur protest
activity (Barberá et al. 2015). Yet we know surprisingly little about the causal impact of the
internet on actual voting, least of all for populist parties.1 One of the reasons for this relative
lack of evidence is the longstanding problem of voter self-selection into media exposure
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). Even if we do observe a correlation between voting behaviour and
media use, it is hard to be sure whether what we observe is a causal relationship or a mere
artifact of voters seeking to confirm already existing political positions.
To overcome this problem, we follow Sudulich et al. (2015) and Lelkes et al. (2017) in
combining micro-level outcome data with an instrumental variable (IV) strategy.Our focus
is on two of the major populist parties in Europe, both of which have recently obtained
stunning electoral success: the Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle, M5S) in
Italy and the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) in Germany.
Drawing on survey data collected in the context of the 2013 general election in Italy and
five regional elections in Germany in 2016 and 2017, we trace voter choices and patterns of
internet use at the individual level. We show that, in both countries, the use of the internet
as a source of political information strongly predicts voting for populist parties, but not for
other, mainstream, parties.
To address causality, we adopt an IV strategy. We exploit geographical variation in
broadband coverage as an instrument for internet use. We demonstrate that, conditional
on a number of municipal-level characteristics that have shaped the roll-out of broadband
internet, this variation in coverage is orthogonal to a large number of possible confounders.
By instrumenting internet use with broadband coverage, we show that the correlation
discovered in the first step can be interpreted as causal. The increasing availability and use
of broadband internet has indeed contributed to the rise of populism in both Germany and
Italy, even though the size of this contribution is modest. Our findings add to a growing but
limited number of studies that provide real-world evidence for the causal effect of media
on political outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to demonstrate a
causal link between one of the most puzzling political phenomena of our time – the steady
rise of populist parties – and the spread of broadband internet.
Populism and the spread of broadband internet
Populist parties have been on a slow but steady rise in Europe. Inglehart and Norris (2017)
estimate that their share of seats in national and European parliament elections rose
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from 10 per cent in the 1960s to 25 per cent in 2015. This increase in importance appears
to have accelerated in recent years, which saw populist parties consolidating substantial
shares of the vote in France, the Netherlands and Austria, while reaching record highs in
Germany, Italy and Sweden. Most importantly, Brexit (the decision by British voters to
exit the European Union) was promoted by Britain’s right-wing populist United Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP) and driven by nativist and anti-elitist motives (Iakhnis et al.
2018). In the United States, the last decade or so saw the development of the Tea Party,
which shares many of the characteristics of European (right-wing) populist parties (Skocpol
& Williamson 2016), and in 2016, American voters elected Donald Trump as president,
whose frequent use of anti-elitist messages and appeals to America’s traditional values
resemble the typical communication style of other populist leaders (Inglehart & Norris
2017).
The rise of populist parties and politicians inWestern democracies has been attributed to
the relative demise in status of working-class men, who feel left behind and turn to populist
politicians and parties for support (Gidron & Hall 2017). Sharpened economic competition
and the economic crisis of 2008–2009 have not only exacerbated such feelings of relative
deprivation (Colantone&Stanig 2018),but have also contributed to constraining themargin
of manoeuver for traditional parties, thus reducing their traditional representative function,
to the advantage of new, populist actors (Kriesi 2014). Other scholars contend that the
support for populism is better explained as a cultural backlash against postmaterialist values
than by economic factors (Inglehart & Norris 2017). This culturalist perspective focuses on
right-wing populist parties’ frequent appeals to traditional values and their anti-immigration
stance (Ivarsflaten 2008).
As a concept, populism remains contested. Among possible definitions, the so-called
‘ideational approach’ has gained prominence among scholars. According to this approach,
populism can be defined as a set of ideas that share an anti-elitist dimension, where ‘the
pure people’ are pitted against ‘the corrupted elites’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). A
parsimonious definition of populism, therefore, sees it as a communication style of political
actors that refer to ‘the people’ and claim to speak in their name (Canovan 1981; Jagers &
Walgrave 2007). Indeed, scholars have argued that such a communication style is a defining
feature of contemporary populism, arguing that ‘the populist ideology manifests itself in the
political communication strategies of populist leaders’ (Kriesi 2014:364).Thus,populism can
also be conceived as a ‘discursive frame’ (Aslanidis 2016) or a ‘communication phenomenon’
(De Vreese et al. 2018), in which the media used to communicate is as important as the
content of the messages.
It therefore makes sense to ask how the increased availability of broadband internet
and the new communication channels this expansion has promoted have affected the
success of populists. Since the advent of the internet, scholars have investigated the impact
of this new technology on several aspects of politics, including populism (Bimber 1998).
Only recently, however, have scholars started to provide causally identified estimates for
the impact of broadband internet and social media on political behaviour. These studies
have shown that broadband internet can increase partisan hostility (Lelkes et al. 2017),
boost grassroots protest movements (Campante et al. 2018), influence turnout (Falck et al.
2014; Larcinese &Miner 2017), and increase electoral uncertainty (Sudulich et al. 2015) and
protest activity (Barberá et al. 2015).Yet,with one recent exception (Falck et al. 2014), there
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is practically no causal evidence of how the diffusion of broadband internet impacts actual
voting.
We argue that broadband internet is of particular use for populists, giving them a relative
advantage over other parties. We believe that this is due to three qualities common to
populists, but not shared by mainstream parties: (1) populists often need to circumvent
gatekeepers in the mainstream media, especially in countries where tabloid media outlets
are weak or unsupportive; (2) populists seek to maintain an anti-elitist and people-centric
stance that stresses a direct connection to ‘the people’; and (3) populists often use and
rely on borderline truths and forged content that would not receive (sufficient) coverage
in most mainstream media. Populist parties and politicians in many countries are seen as
mavericks that adopt untenable positions. Journalists working for mainstream media will
often be unwilling to cover them favourably, partially because of professional norms that
stress impartial, fair and responsible reporting (Aalberg et al. 2016). Clearly, this argument
does not imply that traditional media are always hostile towards populist movements. The
media can be both ‘friends and foes’ of populist parties (Mudde 2007: 49). In particular,
tabloid media can be supportive of populist movements, as could be observed during the
Brexit referendum campaign in the United Kingdom (Deacon et al. 2016). In extreme cases,
as in some Central and Eastern European countries, media and populist parties go hand
in glove, resulting in a ‘congruence of stylistic elements between media logic and political
populism’ (Esser et al. 2016: 10).
Yet, even where populists enjoy substantial visibility in the mainstream media, they may
still be tempted to use online tools as an additional communication channel. The 2016
American presidential election is a case in point. While Donald Trump benefited from
increased mainstream media coverage during the primary election campaign (Reuning &
Dietrich 2019), another reason for his success was arguably his hybrid-media campaign,
which relied heavily on social media (Wells et al. 2016). Comparative evidence shows
that populist parties in many European countries (including France, the United Kingdom,
Italy, Spain, Austria and Norway) have invested heavily in online channels of direct
communication, no matter what the media system (Esser et al. 2016).
Second, we argue that the online tools enabled by the expansion of broadband
coverage disproportionally favour populists because they allow them tomaintain ideological
consistency. Besides needing to circumvent mainstream media that act as gatekeepers,
populist actors want to avoid the established media. There is general consensus among
scholars that a defining feature of populism – regardless of whether left-wing or right-wing
– is the postulated ‘antagonistic relationship between the corrupt elite and the virtuous
people’ (Rooduijn 2019: 363). Populists often deride established media outlets as part of
the very elite they are attacking, and claim to speak directly ‘to the people and for the
people’ (Urbinati 2019: 8). This is true not only for right-wing populists (Esser et al. 2016:
10), but also for left-wing or ideologically hybrid populist movements (Casero-Ripollé et al.
2016; Engesser et al. 2017). Populist rhetoric, in turn, finds a perfect ally in online platforms
that allow them to communicate directly with party supporters, cutting out traditional
media intermediaries. Content analysis of social-media messages confirms that elements of
both anti-elitism and people-centrism tend to be present in the online communication of
populist parties in countries such as Austria, Italy, Switzerland and the United Kingdom,
even though the media environment in these countries differs starkly (Engesser et al. 2017).
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We therefore secondMoffitt (2016: 92),who argues that ‘populist actors have benefited from
the ability [of new media] to reach “the people” in a low-cost and efficient manner that
sidesteps traditional media channels, while at the same time appearing to be more “direct”,
“immediate” and accountable to their “people”’.
A third reason why populists profit particularly strongly from new online platforms
has to do with the type of content they frequently tend to share, but which mainstream
parties typically shy away from: unverified or outright forged media items. During the 2016
American electoral campaign, many news items circulated online that were later proven to
be factually wrong,and the vastmajority of these news items favoured the populist candidate
Donald Trump (Guess et al. 2018b). This is relevant because manipulative, false content
appears to diffuse ‘farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth’ (Vosoughi et al.
2018: 1146).
Similarly, during the campaign for the 2017 national election in Germany, AfD
representatives frequently shared news items that were known to be manipulated and taken
out of context (Sängerlaub et al. 2018). The internet can be a fertile ground for diffusing
conspiracy theories that echo the anti-elitist stance of populist movements. Indeed, evidence
shows that belief in conspiracy theories correlates with support for populist parties in Italy
(Mancosu et al. 2017) and with extreme left-wing and right-wing ideology in the United
States, the Netherlands and Sweden (Castanho Silva et al. 2017; Marwick & Lewis 2017;
Krouwel et al. 2017).
It is important to reiterate that none of the above points fully applies to mainstream
parties. Established parties usually maintain good links with the mainstream press and have
no need to circumvent them. They do not typically deride mainstream media and thus do
not have to keep their distance.And they are usually committed to operating on the basis of
facts, so that relying on false information would harm their credibility. For these reasons, we
contend that broadband internet has given an advantage to populist parties that established
parties cannot fully use.
The five star movement and the alternative for Germany
This paper focuses on two of the major populist parties in Europe: the M5S in Italy and the
AfD in Germany. Although the two parties show some differences in terms of ideological
orientation and issue positions, during the 2014–2019 legislative period of the European
Parliament they belonged to the same parliamentary group (‘Europe of Freedom andDirect
Democracy’), which united them with other populist parties like the British UKIP.
The Five Star Movement (M5S)
Founded by the charismatic comedian Beppe Grillo in 2009, the M5S competed at the
national level for the first time in the general election of 2013. By gaining around a quarter
of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies (25.6 per cent), the party reached astonishing
electoral success without precedent in postwar Italian history for a party running for the first
time. In the subsequent national election in 2018, the party managed to increase its share of
the vote still further, with one Italian voter in three opting for the M5S in the race for the
Chamber of Deputies (32.7 per cent). TheM5S claims to be ‘outside’ the left-right spectrum
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(Bordignon & Ceccarini 2013). However, the M5S shares some key features of populism,
such as strong anti-elitist rhetoric – in which the ‘people’ are opposed to corrupted political
elites – and emphasis on a direct connection between the leader of the movement and his
supporters. The M5S’s main means of communicating with its supporters is Beppe Grillo’s
blog, a popular website that exemplifies the philosophy of theM5S since it enables its leader
to cut out mainstream media as a communication intermediary and disseminate unfiltered
content (Mosca & Vaccari 2013).
The Alternative for Germany (AfD)
Founded in 2013, the original agenda of the AfD was to oppose German financial support
for other European countries and Europe’s common monetary regime. The party then
quickly drifted to the populist political right, taking up issues such as the ‘fight against
political correctness’, and rejecting the acceptance of refugees (Schmitt-Beck 2017). Like
the M5S, the AfD quickly rose to power, entering first the European Parliament and then
the regional parliaments of all Germany’s 16 states. The AfD entered the Bundestag, the
national parliament, for the first time in the 2017 general election, garnering 12.6 per cent of
the vote – the third-best performance of all parties. The party heavily relies on social media
websites to interact with members, supporters, the media and the general public. Facebook
is of particular importance for the party. As of December 2018, the official fan page of the
AfD’s federal organisation counted almost 440,000 likes. This was more than twice as many
as the largest German parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats (with
around 190,000 likes each), could muster.
Empirical strategy
We test the hypothesis that the rise of populist parties can be partly attributed to the effect of
online tools and communication strategies enabled by the proliferation of broadband access.
Our empirical strategy consists of two steps. First, we show that internet use consistently
predicts voting for both the M5S and the AfD. In a second step, we seek to establish the
direction of the causal arrow. Is it internet use that makes people vote for populists, or do
those who are ideologically aligned with the populist agenda (and would vote for populist
parties anyway) simply seek information online more frequently? To address this challenge,
we follow recent contributions in the field and adopt an IV strategy (cp. Falck et al. 2014;
Sudulich et al. 2015; Lelkes et al. 2017), instrumenting individual internet use with variation
in broadband coverage at the level of the municipality.
Survey data: Italy
We rely on the fourth and the fifth wave of the ‘2013 inter-electoral ITANES panel’ (Belluci
&Maraffi 2014),whichwere conducted by telephone interview,respectively,before and after
the general election of 24–25 February 2013. A total of 1,158 respondents took part in the
two waves. Respondents come from 783 municipalities throughout Italy.
Our dependent variable is the respondent’s vote as recalled in the post-electoral Wave
5.We recoded the variable either as a dummy (assigning a value of 1 to those who voted for
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M5S, and 0 to all other respondents), or as a choice variable, in which we assigned different
values for all the parties that received more than 4 per cent of the vote. Our independent
variable is a question in Wave 4 about the main source of information on the upcoming
election. Respondents were asked: ‘Where do you receive most information on the election
that will be held in a few months?’ Possible answers included traditional media (television,
radio, newspapers), personal contacts and the internet.We recoded the variable as a dummy,
assigning a value of 1 to those who used the internet as their main source of information,
and 0 to all other responses.
Survey data: Germany
Individual-level data for Germany come from the German Longitudinal Election Study
(GLES) project. We draw on pre-electoral surveys collected in the context of regional
elections held in different German states between March 2016 and May 2017, before the
national election in September 2017 (Roßteutscher et al. 2017).2 The dataset comprises
1,929 observations collected by telephone and online interview. We include data from
pre-electoral GLES surveys conducted since the AfD abandoned its national-conservative
approach for a distinctly right-wing populist approach, marked by the shift in leadership
from Bernd Lucke to Frauke Petry in summer 2015. The data come from five different
states and a large number of municipalities (940 zip code districts) distributed across
all geographical areas of the country – and thus provide ample variation in broadband
coverage.3
Our dependent variable is the intention to vote for AfD in the 2017 national elections.
In line with the analysis of the ITANES data, we present two versions of the dependent
variable: a binary variable, which codes whether an individual intends to vote for the AfD
or not; and a choice variable, which records which of the six major parties a person intends
to cast their vote for.Our independent variable captures the use of the internet for political
purposes. The question reads: ‘During the past week, on how many days have you used the
internet to inform yourself about politics and political parties?’ Respondents could answer
on an 8-point scale, ranging from ‘not at all’ to up to ‘7 days’. We rescale this variable to
range between 0 (no internet use) to 1 (everyday use) to make it comparable to the Italian
data.
In order to improve the precision of our estimates, all our regression models include
standard sociodemographic controls (respondents’ gender, age and level of education),4
a dummy variable for whether the respondent lives in either a central or peripheral
municipality, and a geographical indicator for the different areas of Italy (north-west,
north-east, centre, south, islands).Models that combine data for different states in Germany
also include regional dummies to account for heterogeneity at this level. To keep our
estimates comparable across models, we also include municipality-level controls that
ensure the ignorability of our instrument, notably population density, the steepness of the
terrain, a municipality’s average level of education, average age and unemployment rate.
All of these variables are from the early 2000s, before the roll-out of broadband internet.
Acknowledging that control variables can sometimes artificially inflate effect sizes (Lenz &
Sahn 2018), for all major models we also report ‘naive’ results, including only region-fixed
effects.
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Figure 1. Logic of the empirical strategy.
Notes: Schematic overview of empirical strategy. Solid lines indicate causal relationships discussed in the
text.Dashed lines stand for potential threats to inference resulting from potential interrelationships between
individual-level and municipality-level characteristics.
Instrumental variable
While the inclusion of these variables strengthens the validity of regression estimates, it
does not allow us to address the problem of reverse causality. It is plausible to assume that
individuals seek out information about their preferred parties online, which would create
a causal arrow running from party preference to internet use, and would bias estimates. To
overcome this problem,we instrument internet use with the degree to which a respondent’s
home municipality is covered by broadband internet by either landline or mobile phones.
The IV strategy aims to isolate the part of the variation in internet use that is explained
by variation in availability of broadband internet – and which is accordingly not affected
by reverse causality, as illustrated in Figure 1. Importantly, our instrument is a measure of
broadband availability instead of a measure of the proportion of people with an actual
subscription to broadband internet. This latter measure would be problematic since it
would re-introduce the self-selection problem ‘through the backdoor’. Rather, our coverage
measure indicates the extent to which broadband internet is available in principle.
Broadband coverage in Italy and Germany
Data on broadband availability was provided by Infratel on behalf of the Ministry for
Economic Development for Italy, and by the TÜV Rhineland on behalf of the German
Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure forGermany.The figures provided ameasure of the
proportion of households in a municipality with access to internet speeds of 2 Mbits/second
and above in 2013 in Italy, and the proportion of households in a municipality with access
to internet speeds of 6 Mbits/second and above in 2016 in Germany, as shown in Figure 2.5
We recode the values from 0 (no coverage) to 1 (full coverage).
In Online Appendix D, we provide a detailed description of how broadband internet
was rolled out in Italy and Germany. Of importance for our causal identification strategy,
the development of broadband internet in both countries was based on the pre-existing
telephone network. Varying distances between the central network hubs and individual
households created variation in broadband speed, especially in rural and suburban areas.
Crucially, these distances had been irrelevant for the original purpose of connecting
households to the telephone network, meaning that the resulting variation in broadband
speed has little to do with strategic ormarket decisions taken at the timewhen the telephone
network was constructed (Campante et al. 2018; Falck et al. 2014).
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Figure 2. Broadband coverage in Italy and Germany. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Notes:Broadband coverage at themunicipality level in (a) Italy 2013 and (b) Germany 2016.Darker colours
indicate higher coverage. German states from which survey data is drawn are marked with an asterisk ().
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Still, strategic concerns did play a role in determining where internet service providers
would roll out broadband connectivity first.Of overriding concern to providers is the degree
of urbanisation or population density,which largely determines the expected financial return
of investing in broadband technology (Gruber et al. 2014). In addition, steep hillsides make
construction difficult, which is why rugged areas tend to be more poorly provided with all
forms of telecommunication technology. There is also evidence that places with relatively
high education levels, a youthful population and a strong economy – likely factors associated
with higher demand for broadband internet – were given preference during the roll-out.6
Our empirical models reflect this ‘assignment process’ of broadband coverage by including
control variables for these municipality-level characteristics.We provide evidence that, once
these characteristics are taken into account, the population in poorly covered areas is closely
comparable to the population in more fully covered areas.
Instrument strength and exclusion restriction
In order for broadband access to be a valid instrument, two criteria have to be met. First,
the instrument has to correlate with the potentially endogenous predictor ‘internet use’ in
meaningful ways. Previous research shows that, typically, this criterion is fulfilled – that is,
internet use is strongly elastic to access to fast internet connections in the United States
(Hitt & Tambe 2007), and in Europe.7 Instrument strength is measured in a first-stage
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression where the endogenous predictor is regressed on
the instrument plus the other pre-treatment covariates used in the analysis. Estimating the
first stage using our survey data from Italy and Germany reveals that our instruments are
slightly below the critical threshold of an F-value of 10: the F-statistic is 8.6 for Italy and 7.8
for Germany (see Table A1 in the Online Appendix)
Since we are dealing with weak instruments,we follow the advice of Angrist and Pischke
(2009) to focus on confidence intervals rather than point estimates, and also to report
reduced form estimates – that is, the results from a regression of the outcome on the
instrument. In an experimental setting, the reduced form estimates the intention-to-treat
(ITT) effect. In other words, the effect of full internet coverage on the probability of voting
for populist parties, regardless of whether people individually make use of broadband
internet or not.More importantly, the reduced form is estimated using OLS and hence does
not suffer from systematic bias.
Second, for the instrument to be valid, the only channel through which broadband
availability influences voting behaviour should be to make it easier for people to use the
internet (exclusion restriction).Another way of conceiving of the exclusion restriction is that
broadband access should be as good as randomly distributed.We argue that this criterion is
fulfilled conditional on pre-treatment municipality-level factors that determined where the
expansion of broadband coverage would first take place. Apart from population density
and terrain steepness, these municipality-level factors include age structure (captured
by the share of the population over 65 years of age), economic strength (measured
with the unemployment rate) and education level (indicated by the share of the highly
educated).
However, we might still be concerned that there could be residual causal pathways
caused by some unobserved municipality-level covariates. In order to further reduce this
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Figure 3. Conditional independence of the instrument.
Notes: Results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of broadband coverage in Italy and Germany on
various individual-level covariates, simultaneously controlling for municipality-level covariates and region
fixed effects.Markers (dots) are point estimates; the thick/thin horizontal lines are 90/95 per cent confidence
intervals.
threat to inference, we therefore include the same set of individual-level controls in
our instrumental variable regressions as in the simple OLS regressions, notably gender,
age, education and employment status. The idea is that potential causal pathways from
municipal-level factors to our outcome that do not run through increased internet use should
work through individual-level characteristics. However, regression analysis in Figure 3
shows that these worries are largely unwarranted since no predictors within a large set of
control variables is significantly associated with our instrument (i.e., broadband coverage).
In other words, after controlling for municipality-level characteristics, populations in
areas with high broadband coverage are indistinguishable from those in areas with
low broadband coverage – except for the fact that they use the internet at higher
rates.
As an additional test, we conduct a falsification exercise. If the exclusion restriction is
met,broadband availability should not predict behaviours that are not linked to internet use,
such as the use of newspapers as a source of news. Figure A1 in the Online Appendix shows
that newspaper consumption appears to be unrelated to broadband coverage, increasing our
confidence in the validity of the instrument.
Results
Correlational analysis
We begin our analysis by testing whether the use of the internet as the main source of
news correlates positively with voting for M5S in Italy. In the first model of Table 1, we
report naive regression results of populist voting on internet use, including only region-
fixed effects. In models 2 and 3, we also control for the individual- and municipality-level
covariates introduced above. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the municipality
to account for potential interdependencies among individuals from the same municipality.
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Table 1. Internet use and party vote in Italy
(1) (2) (3)
Base outcome = Voted for PD
M5S versus others M5S PDL Scelta Civica Lega Nord
Internet main source 0.158*** 0.136*** 0.105*** −0.053 −0.012 −0.004
(0.040) (0.040) (0.026) (0.037) (0.023) (0.019)
Sociodemographics No Yes Yes
Municipal-level controls No Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 1,158 1,158 1,158
R2/Pseudo R2 0.028 0.045 0.051
Notes: Models 1 and 2: Linear probability model (OLS regression). Dependent variable: Vote for M5S as
recalled in post-election Wave 5. Model 3: Marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression, categories
‘other parties’ and ‘did not vote’ omitted for readability purposes. Internet main source: Respondents who
chose ‘internet’ as main source of news on the upcoming election. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered
at the municipality level. Full results in Table A2 in the Online Appendix. ***p < 0.01.
Models 1 and 2 show that the use of broadband internet significantly and strongly predicts
voting for M5S: those who rely on the internet as their main source of political information
are 14–16 per cent more likely to vote for M5S than those who rely on other sources of
information.8
Results from a multinomial logistic regression in model 3 confirm these findings. Those
who relied on the internet as their primary news source were 11 per cent more likely to vote
for M5S than those who voted for the main centre-left party (Partito Democratico, PD). No
significant correlations can be observed with votes for the other parties.9
Our findings from Germany, presented in Table 2, mirror those from Italy. Use of the
internet for political purposes strongly predicts voting intentions for the AfD.Moving from
no internet use for political purposes to everyday use increases the inclination to vote for
the AfD by 10 per cent (models 1 and 2) – an effect closely resembling the estimates from
Italy. These results hold up when AfD supporters are compared to voters of the other major
parties in a multinomial logistic model (model 3). Here we see that internet use strongly
predicts voting for the AfD, and marginally for the liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei,
FDP). Internet use for political purposes is somewhat negatively associated with voting for
the conservative CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union).
Instrumental variable estimates
Next, we implement our IV strategy. The results are summed up in Figure 4 (full results can
be found in Tables A5–A8 in the Online Appendix).We see that both the reduced form and
the second stage from the two-stage least square (TSLS) regression strongly and positively
predict voting for M5S and Afd. The reduced form/ITT suggests that the expansion of
broadband coverage from zero to full coverage is associated with a 16.1 per cent increase in
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Table 2. Internet use and party vote in Germany
(1) (2) (3)
Base outcome = Voted for SPD
AfD versus others AfD CDU Greens FDP Linke
Internet political news 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.095*** –0.087** −0.026 0.042** 0.010
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018)
Sociodemographics No Yes Yes
Municipal-level controls No Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 1,913 1,913 1,913
R2/Pseudo R2 0.029 0.055 0.062
Notes: Models 1 & 2: Linear probability model (OLS regression). Dependent variable: Intends to vote for
the AfD in the 2017 general elections.Model 3:Marginal effects frommultinomial logit regression.Category
‘other parties’ not included in the table to increase readability. Internet political use: Number of days the
internet was used to obtain information on politics and political parties (scaled to 0–1). Standard errors (in
parentheses) clustered at the zip code level. Full results in TableA3 in the Online Appendix. **p < 0.05;
***p < 0.01.
the likelihood of voting for the M5S, and a 27 per cent increase in the likelihood of voting
for the AfD.
The second stage gives us an estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE) for
compliers – that is, an estimate of the treatment effect for those enabled by broadband
coverage to use the internet as their main source of news. We estimate that, among this
subgroup, the probability of voting for M5S increases by 75 per cent, while the probability
of voting for the AfD increases by 64.4 per cent. It is important to underline that we do
not estimate the effect of using the internet for the entire population, but only for those
who decided to use the internet once broadband was available (compliers). Partially for
this reason, the TSLS regression estimates are substantially larger than the reduced-form
estimates.
As may be expected when using a relatively weak instrument, our results are subject to
a great deal of uncertainty. Indeed, the 95 per cent confidence intervals range from 9 to 141
per cent forM5S,and from 3.4 to 125.4 per cent for theAfD.We hence cannot be certain that
the LATE actually corresponds to the high point estimate.However, the second stage TSLS
estimators comfortably include our point estimates from the standard regressions, giving us
confidence that these can be interpreted as causal.
The other lines in Figure 4 show the results of the IV analysis for the other parties
in Italy and Germany. We see that internet coverage and use increased the vote share
for populist parties only. For none of the other parties is the causal effect distinguishable
from zero. The advantages of broadband internet, it appears, are indeed unique to populist
parties.
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Figure 4. Instrumental variable results.
Notes: Instrumental variable (reduced form and two-stage least square) results for parties that contested
the analysed elections in Italy (left) and Germany (right).Markers (dots) are point estimates; the thick/thin
horizontal lines are 90/95 per cent confidence intervals.
Heterogeneous effects
After demonstrating the effect of broadband internet on support for populist parties,we test
whether the magnitude of these effects differs across various segments of the electorate.We
have argued above that broadband internet is of particular use for populists compared to
mainstream political actors because it allows populists to circumvent gatekeepers, maintain
an anti-elitist and people-centric stance, and rely on forged or borderline-true content.Thus,
if we assume that onlinemessages can influence political behavior – as the studiesmentioned
above document (for a recent review, see also Tucker et al. 2018) – populists should be able
to persuade and mobilise voters through online media, and they should be able to do so
more effectively than mainstream parties. While our analysis confirms that this is the case
when we consider the average effect of broadband internet on voting, it does not, however,
exclude the possibility that certain categories of votersmight bemore susceptible to populist
communication than others. In other words, our ‘treatment’ (i.e., broadband access) might
have heterogeneous effects depending on individual-level characteristics.
Drawing on the literature, we identified four characteristics of theoretical interest. A
first dimension concerns voters’ ideological self-placement. Internet use might activate pre-
existing political attitudes and help to turn them into actual political behaviour. Through
the internet, potential voters for as of yet fringe populist parties can discover that others
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share their opinion, especially by engaging in many-to-many dialogues that set online
communication apart from traditional media (Bimber 1998). At the worst, the internet
allows individuals to enter echo chambers where their own opinion appears to dominate
(Quattrociocchi et al. 2016). Thus, assuming that left-right placement is a relatively stable
trait (Knutsen 1995), we can expect populist parties’ online communication to have a
stronger activating effect among individuals who share the political orientation of the parties
in focus. For Germany this means the effect should be stronger among those who place
themselves on the political right. In the case of Italy, we can expect the effect of broadband
internet on voting for theM5S to be stronger among those who place themselves outside the
left-right scale,given the ‘post-ideological’ nature of theM5S (Bordignon&Ceccarini 2013).
Besides activating pre-existing political attitudes,populist onlinemessagesmight succeed
in mobilising certain categories of voters who would otherwise not participate in politics
or would cast a protest vote. First, we can expect populist messages to be particularly
appealing for lower or middle class voters who largely count among the so-called ‘losers of
globalisation’ – a segment of voters who have been particularly susceptible to the appeal of
populists (Kriesi 2014). Second, broadband internet might help populist parties to mobilise
previous non-voters.Post-election surveys frombothGermany and Italy have shown that the
AfD and theM5S attracted particularly many previous non-voters disaffected by traditional
party politics (Berbuir et al. 2015; Russo et al. 2017). Thus, we can expect the effect of
broadband access to be stronger among those who did not participate in previous rounds
of national elections. Finally, populists’ online communication might succeed in mobilising
especially young voters,amongwhom socialmedia use has been shown to be linked to higher
political engagement (Holt et al. 2013).
We tested these predictions by interacting our instrument with a set of sociodemographic
characteristics at the individual level. In Figure 5 we show the effect of moving fromminimal
broadband coverage (around 25 per cent of households) to full coverage within each of
the identified subgroups. We caution that this analysis is merely exploratory because our
chosen characteristics may be correlated with other covariates. What is more, even if there
appear to be visible differences between subgroups, these may not in fact be statistically
different from each other. For each category we therefore report the results of a Wald test
of the null hypothesis that all subgroup effects are equal. Finally, we should caution that we
report heterogeneity in the ITT effects – that is, the overall causal effect of the roll-out of
broadband coverage.This is different from the local causal effect of internet use (the LATE).
In particular, the ITT may be influenced by differential compliance rates among subgroups.
We explore these possibilities in Figure A3 in the Online Appendix, where we show first-
stage andTSLS results alongside the reduced form estimates.Given these caveats, the results
presented here should be merely seen as suggestions for further research.
As far as ideology is concerned, broadband access appears to have the largest overall
effect on voting for the M5S among those who do not place themselves on the left-right
scale, in line with predictions. In the case of theAfD, in contrast,we observe the largest effect
among those who are at the centre of the political spectrum, while we find no effect among
those on the right. This suggests that, while the online communications of the M5S activated
support among non-ideological voters, the AfD succeeded in actually persuading centrist
voters to support it. The lack of effect among right-wing German voters may be explained
by the fact that these voters were already committed to supporting the AfD, regardless of
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Figure 5. Heterogeneous treatment effects.
Notes: Heterogeneous treatment effects along several dimensions of theoretical interest. The depicted
coefficients are marginal effects from reduced form regressions (ITT) where the dependent variable
(populist voting) is regressed on the instrument (broadband coverage) interacted with measures for the
indicated variables. Social class based on type of employment (Italy) and self-reported classification
(Germany).Markers (dots) are point estimates; the thick/thin horizontal lines are 90/95 per cent confidence
intervals.
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whether or not they had access to AfD’s online communication. However, both in Italy
(p = 0.29) and Germany (p = 0.42), the Wald tests fails to establish statistically significant
differences between subgroups.
With respect to the possibility of mobilisation, we observe that broadband access mostly
mobilised middle-class voters in Germany,while the effect did not differ substantially across
social classes in Italy, in line with expectations. Contrary to expectations, however, we do
not find stronger mobilisation of previous non-voters: within this section of the electorate,
broadband access had no effect on support for populist parties in either Italy or Germany.
Rather, the effect is entirely driven by those who participated in previous rounds of national
elections. In any case, differences between subgroups are not statistically significant in either
Italy (p = 0.45 and p = 0.44, respectively) or Germany (p = 0.88 and p = 0.43, respectively).
Finally, Figure 5 shows that broadband access had the strongest effect among the
youngest segment of the electorate in both countries, and a much lower or no effect among
middle-aged and older voters.Here, the Wald tests detect significant levels of heterogeneity
in treatment effects for both Italy (p = 0.09) and Germany (p = 0.02). As shown in Figure
A3 in the Online Appendix, it is likely that the strong ITT effect among the young is partly
due to higher compliance rates in this subgroup. Provided with faster internet, young people
increase their online news consumption more strongly than other age groups, meaning that
they are exposed to the populist messages circulating online in larger numbers. In sum, these
findings suggest that broadband internet might have contributed to increasing support for
populist parties in Italy and Germany not by mobilising those who had previously refrained
from voting, but by activating either non-ideologically aligned voters (Italy) or centrist
voters (Germany), and by mobilising middle-class German voters, and especially the young.
If we consider that early voting can be habit forming (Dinas 2012), the mobilising effect
of broadband internet among young voters has particularly important implications for the
long-term support for populist parties.
Conclusion
We tested whether the dissemination of broadband internet can help to explain the rise
of populist parties in Europe. While this was only one factor among many, our answer is
affirmative. We show that internet use goes strongly and consistently along with voting for
populist parties (but not for mainstream parties) in both Italy and Germany. Exploiting
variation in access to broadband internet, we show that this effect is causal. Our analysis
of potential channels relating internet use to populist voting indicates that, most plausibly,
the expansion of broadband coverage has helped populist parties to reach and mobilise new
voters, especially among the young. These findings are in line with the understanding of
populism as a communication style that appeals directly to concerns left unaddressed by
other parties. Populists, we show, find the perfect tool in broadband internet.
Importantly,we do not claim that broadband internet is themain determinant of support
for populism, or that populist messages can persuade voters only through the internet.Echo
chambers exist not only in the online world, and recent evidence indicates that they might
be even stronger in offline social networks (Guess et al. 2018a: 15; see also Tucker et al.
2018).We cannot exclude, however, that at least some of those who are exposed to populist
messages online will then convey these messages to offline social networks, thus expanding
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the reach of populist communication beyond online echo chambers.While the role of offline
social networks falls beyond the scope of our study, we believe that investigating the spill-
over effects of online populist communication proves a promising avenue for research.
What kind of context may our findings generalise to? We believe that two interrelated
scope conditions may be important: a lack of access to the main political arenas (especially
the national parliament), and exclusion from mainstream media coverage. As explained
above, both conditions were true for the two parties we focus on during the periods
under study, and are likely to apply to populist parties elsewhere, especially newly founded
ones. This may also give us some indication of where an effect of broadband internet on
support for populist parties is not to be expected: where populists are present on the main
political stage, and where they receive the support of the mainstream media. The right-wing
populists of the National Rally in France (the former Front National), for example, have
long had representatives in the national parliament, as had their populist peers from the
Austrian Freedom Party. In the United Kingdom, the populist UKIP and Brexit Party are
given substantial favourable coverage by the tabloid press, despite not being represented
in Parliament. Under such conditions, populists might not perceive the need to take their
mobilising efforts online. However, these are no hard-and-fast criteria. As we have argued,
populists may profit from online communication for reasons that go beyond simply ‘having
a voice’ – namely maintaining ideological consistency and spreading borderline truths or
forged content.
As regards the ideological stance of populist movements, we believe that both left-
wing and right-wing populist parties and politicians should benefit from using online
communication channels, as long as these actors share an anti-elitist and people-centric
rhetoric. In contrast, as confirmed by our empirical findings, mainstream parties should
not benefit to the same extent from online media, since they do not share the same
type of rhetoric that distinguishes populist movements. Online communication should be
particularly vital for right-wing populists, insofar as they spread strongly anti-immigrant
or plainly xenophobic messages, which would hardly be covered by mainstream media.
Ultimately, the extent to which our findings hold in other contexts is an empirical question
that needs to be addressed by ongoing research.
Finally, it is worth asking how lasting broadband-induced support for populists will be.
On the one hand, populist parties were the first to recognise the potential of the internet,
and have eagerly used it. They could possibly lose this advantage in the future when other
parties have managed to catch up.On the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that
what we are observing is the result of a structural change. Almost by definition, populist
parties address issues that are outside mainstream party politics, often reaching well into
the territory of the politically incorrect and drawing on scarcely verified information. The
communication style of President Donald Trump is a case in point.Conventional parties and
themainstreammedia are, for good reason,hesitant to cover this type of content.Broadband
internet allows populists to get their message across nonetheless. The internet thus appears
to have expanded political communication options in a way that disproportionately benefits
populists. In other words, the advantage populists have gained with the spread of broadband
internet is likely to persist.
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Notes
1. An exception is a study by Falck et al. (2014), who do not find an effect of internet access on party votes
in Germany for the period 2005–2008 (i.e., pre-dating the birth of Germany’s populist party).
2. In Section G in the Online Appendix we replicate the analysis using data from a post-election cross-
section survey collected after the 2017 general elections. This survey, however, does not allow us to apply
our IV strategy due to its clustered sampling design.
3. Notably, we draw on data from the states of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in the
north of the country, Sachsen-Anhalt in the center east, and Rheinland-Pfalz and Baden-Württemberg in
the south-west (see Figure 2b). In each case, the data are representative for the state in which they were
collected.
4. Research shows that these characteristics are associated with right-wing populism. In particular, studies
have found that males, younger and older voters, and those with an intermediate level of education are
more likely to vote for the populist right than their relative counterparts (Arzheimer & Carter 2006).
5. The 6 Mbits/second measure is our preferred indicator for broadband coverage as it marks the speed
above which good-quality video streaming becomes unproblematic (Ezell et al. 2009). For Italy, only the
2 Mbits/second measure was available through Infratel.
6. In our data, average education levels and average age correlate with the residuals of a regression of
broadband coverage on population density in Italy, but not in Germany.
7. Using Eurostat data from 2013, we find a clear correlation between the frequent use of the internet and
the percentage of households with broadband coverage inEUmember states.See FigureA4 in theOnline
Appendix.
8. When we include other predictors frequently cited in the literature such as political interest, left-right
self- placement and distrust in parties, the predictive effect of internet use slightly decreases (to 10 per
cent), but remains statistically significant. Distrust in parties stands out as the strongest predictor: those
who do not trust political parties are 27 per cent more likely to vote for the M5S than those who do.
Similar results hold for Germany (see Table A2 in the Online Appendix).
9. The Lega Nord (Northern League) shares many features of other right-wing populist parties. We may
therefore expect to see a positive effect of internet use for this party as well. However, due to an
embezzlement scandal, the party performed poorly in the 2013 general election. It is only with the
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subsequent change of leadership that the party adopted a communication strategy that strongly relies
on social media, and which may have contributed to the electoral success in the 2018 general election.
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